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"Do you really get what you pay for?" - Compensation of Mortgage
Brokers Restricted by the Eleventh Circuit
by Robert Kurinsky

Few individuals who
take out mortgage loans
receive the lowest interest
rate available. While that
may be expected, the
disbursement of the excess
interest is restricted by
federal law. Specifically,
the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA")
prohibits lenders from
providing mortgage
brokers with kickbacks or
referral fees. However,
payments in exchange for
either goods or services
are not prohibited by
RESPA. In Culpepperv.
Inland Mortgage Corp.,
1998 WL 5591 (1998), the
United States Court of
Appeals of the Eleventh
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Circuit ruled that a
contractual payment by a
lender to a mortgage
broker for the origination
of a loan above the
lender's minimum interest
rate was a prohibited
referral fee. In rendering
this decision, the court
reversed the district court
decision granting Inland's
motion for summary
judgment.
Class Action Suit Creates
Case of First Impression
by Alleging a Yield
Spread Premium to be a
Violation of RESPA
The appellants, John and
Patricia Culpepper, were

the named plaintiffs in a
class action suit against
the appellee, Inland
Mortgage Corporation
("Inland"), for an alleged
violation of RESPA
§2607(a). That section of
RESPA specifically
prohibits the payment of
referral fees in the
provision of brokerage
services. The Culpeppers
went to a mortgage
broker, Premiere Mortgage
Company ("Premiere"),
and obtained a federally
insured loan. However,
Premiere did not fund the
Culpeppers' mortgage
loan. Instead, Premiere
only provided the service
of matching the
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Culpeppers with their
lender, Inland, in exchange
for the Culpeppers'
payment of an origination
fee. To provide this
service, Premiere obtained
daily rate sheets from
Inland which demonstrated
the "par" rates on various
loans. These "par" rates

are, essentially, the lowest
interest rates available to
borrowers. Despite a
7.25% par rate, Premiere
quoted the Culpeppers an
interest rate of 7.50%. This
action was critical because
the service agreement
between Inland and
Premiere provided for a
"yield spread premium"
payment from Inland to
Premiere for any loans
originated above the par
rate. This payment was
based solely on the amount
and interest rate of the
loan. As the Culpeppers'
loan was funded at a rate
higher than the par rate,
Premiere received a yield
spread premium payment
from Inland, and the
Culpeppers filed a
resulting claim alleging a
violation of RESPA.
No circuit court had
ever decided whether or
not the payment of a yield
spread premium violated
RESPA; however, various
district court decisions
resolved the issue with

1998

conflicting results. For
example, one district court
stated that a yield spread
premium could constitute
a prohibited referral fee
under RESPA, while
another held it to be a
legal payment in exchange
for services. In referring to
these contrasting
decisions, the court
addressed the following
issues for the first time: (1)
Whether a yield spread
premium constitutes a
referral fee prohibited by
RESPA; (2) Whether a
yield spread premium
constitutes a payment for
goods or services that are
exempt under RESPA's
referral fee prohibition.
Yield Spread Premium
Held to Constitute a
Referral Fee under
RESPA
In determining whether
or not the yield spread
premium paid by Inland
to Premiere constituted a
referral fee as defined by
RESPA, the court first
examined the legislative
history of RESPA. RESPA
was enacted in 1974 to
eliminate unnecessary and
abusive financing costs
associated with buying a
home. According to a 1992
amendment to RESPA, the
funding and origination of

mortgage loans are
covered by the Act.
Specifically, in summing
up the legislative history,
the court decided that
RESPA is violated if "(1) a
payment of a thing of
value is (2) made pursuant
to an agreement to refer
settlement business and
(3) a referral actually
occurs." Culpepper,1998
WL 5591, *3 (11th
Cir.(Ala.)). The court next
applied this checklist to
the facts of the case.
The court determined
that Inland's payment of
the yield spread premium
constituted a referral fee
under RESPA §2607(a)
based on the following
findings: (1) the dealings
between Inland, Premiere,
and the Culpeppers
involved the "settlement"
of a federally insured loan
covered by RESPA; (2)
Inland paid a "thing of
value" to Premiere in the
form of cash; (3) the cash
payment was made
"pursuant to an
agreement" between
Inland and Premiere; and
(4) a "referral actually
occurred" when Premiere
allowed Inland to fund
the Culpeppers' loan. Id.
As the yield spread
premium was determined
to be a referral fee, the
court held that Inland's
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actions violated RESPA.
However, RESPA provides
for the exemption of
settlement service payments
between funders and
brokers when either goods
or services are exchanged,
and Inland argued that its
disbursement fell under
this exemption.
Yield Spread Premium
Held not to be Payment
for Goods or Services
under RESPA
Parties making
settlement service fee
payments in exchange for
goods or services are
exempt from referral fee
violations under RESPA.
The District Court held
Inland's yield spread
premium to be a payment
for a good, the good being
the loan itself. However,
the court overruled this
conclusion. In overruling
its decision, the court held
that since Inland, not
Premiere, funded the loan
at the outset, the loan was
never owned by Premiere.
Therefore, Premiere could
not have sold the loan to
Inland. Further, the court
rejected Inland's argument
that the intangible asset of
Premiere's right to select a
mortgage lender was
indicative of ownership
under RESPA. The court
agreed that Premiere
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possessed that right;
however, Premiere's
exercise of that right in
exchange for payment is
specifically the type of
behavior that RESPA's
referral fee provision
sought to prohibit. Thus,
the court held that a
transfer of goods
ownership did not occur
between Inland and
Premiere. As a result, the
yield spread premium
was not subject to the
"goods" referral fee
exemption under RESPA.
However, Inland argued
in the alternative that the
yield spread premium
was subject to the service
exemption.
Inland argued on two
fronts that the yield spread
premium was subject to
RESPA's "service"
exemption. First, Inland
argued that the yield
spread premium was a
payment to Premiere in
exchange for services
which Premiere provided
to the Culpeppers. The
court agreed that Premiere
provided a valuable service
to the Culpeppers by
locating a mortgage
financier, but disagreed
that the service was related
to the yield spread
premium payment. The
court noted that the
Culpeppers paid an
origination fee to Premiere

in exchange for brokerage
services. Further, the yield
spread premium was
based on the funding rate
of the Culpeppers'
mortgage loan, not on the
level or quality of service
provided. As a result, the
court held the yield
spread premium not to be
a payment for Premiere's
brokerage service provided
to the Culpeppers.
Second, Inland argued
that Premiere's provision
of services to Inland
constituted a RESPA
"services" referral fee
exemption. The court also
rejected this argument by
again stating that the yield
spread premium
possessed no relation to
the level or quality of
service provided by
Premiere to Inland. Instead,
the court restated the fact
that the yield spread
premium was solely based
on the funding rate of the
Culpeppers' mortgage
loan. More specifically, the
payment of a yield spread
premium was only made
on loans originated above
the par rate, and these
originations required the
exact same level of service
as loans originated below
the par rate. The court
applied this rationale in
holding that Inland's
disbursement of the yield
spread premium provided
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Premiere with compensation
for nothing other than the
referral of an above par
loan. As RESPA specifically
prohibits payment for
referral services, the court
held that referral services
cannot be subject to the
services exemption. The
decision that the
disbursement of a yield
spread premium was
neither a payment for a
good nor a service
resulted in the court
concluding that Inland
could not be exempted
from RESPA's referral fee
prohibiting provision.
Court Rejects
Application of RESPA
Market Value Test to
Determine the Existence
of Referral Fee Payments
in Certain Situations
The court also rejected,
as inappropriate, the test
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used by the district court
which led to the dismissal
of the Culpeppers' claim.
The district court applied
a market value test, as
outlined in RESPA, to
determine if the yield
spread premium was a
valid payment for a good
or service. The test
provides that a payment
for a good or service that
greatly exceeds market
value constitutes the
presence of a referral fee.
However, the Eleventh
Circuit held this test to be
misapplied because the
test is only applicable if
the controversy surrounds
a payment for a good or
service. The court ruled
that the transaction
between Inland and
Premiere passed neither
the good nor the service
threshold tests, and
therefore the market value
test did not apply.

Class Action Request to
be Reconsidered
The district court
dismissed, without
prejudice, the Culpeppers'
request to have their claim
certified as a class action
after it granted Inland's
request for summary
judgment. Because of its
reversal of the district
court's decision, the
Eleventh Circuit held the
class action request to be
reinstated and addressed
on remand. In conclusion,
the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district
court's decision and held
that the payment of a
yield spread premium by
a lender to a mortgage
broker constituted a
violation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act
anti-referral fee provision,
§2607(a).
(D
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